Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet

David G. Post/Dawn C. Nunziato/Cyberspace Law Institute

Updated October 1997 
The following cases discuss the propriety of a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants based upon the defendants' Internet activities.

Hearst Corporation v. Goldberger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997)

Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 1997 WL 560048 (2nd Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).

McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, No. 95-4037, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996).

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)

Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996)

EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996)

Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, slip op., available on BNA's Electronic Info. Policy & Law Report at 919 (Ramsey Co. D. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996)

Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997).

Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)

Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)

Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa., Jan 16, 1997) (NO. CIV. A. 96-397 ERIE)

Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1996)

Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523 (S.D. Ind. 1997)

Digital Equipment Corporation v. Altavista Technology, Inc. 960 F.Supp. 456 (D. Mass. March 12, 1997) ( http://zeus.bna.com/e-law/cases/alta.html)

American Network, Inc. v. Access America, 1997 WL 466507 (S.D.N.Y. August 14, 1997)

Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 1997 WL 739021 (9th Cir. (Ariz.) Dec. 2, 1997), 97 C.D.O.S. 9006.

Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F.Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 1997).

Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F.Supp. 327 (D. N.J. Sept. 12, 1997).

Superguide Corp. v. Kegan,  44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1770, 1997 WL 754467 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 1997).

Gary Scott International v. Baroudi, 1997 WL 710369 (D.Mass. Nov. 13, 1997)
 

CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction in Ohio proper over an Internet user from Texas who subscribed to a network service based in Ohio. User "specifically targeted" Ohio by subscribing to the service and entering into a separate agreement with the service to sell his software over the Internet, and advertised his software through the service and repeatedly sent his software to the service in Ohio. Court concluded that the user "reached out" from Texas to Ohio and "originated and maintained" contacts with Ohio. 
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996) Defendant Toeppen, an Illinois resident, was an individual who "attempts to profit from the Internet by reserving and later reselling or licensing domain names back to the companies that spent millions of dollars developing the goodwill of the trademark." Toeppen had registered, as his Internet domain name, Panavision's trademark, as well as the trademarks of numerous other well-known companies. When Panavision later attempted to establish a web site using its own trademarked name, it was prevented from doing so by Toeppen's prior registration. Rather than acquiesce to Toeppen's extortionate demand for $13,000 to release the domain name, Panavision sued in California for trademark infringement. The California court held that jurisdiction was "proper because Toeppen's out-of-state conduct was intended to, and did, result in harmful effects in California." It reasoned that "Toeppen allegedly registered Panavision's trademarks as domain names with the knowledge that the name belonged to Panavision and with the intent to interfere with Panavision's business. Toeppen expressly aimed his conduct at California," which is Panavision's principal place of business. 
EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) In this suit, defendant's contacts with forum state Arizona included a contract with an Arizona company [the plaintiff EDIAS], phone, fax and e-mail communications with EDIAS in Arizona during the business relationship, sales to EDIAS and other Arizona customers, and visits to Arizona. In addition, the defendant had a CompuServe web page on which it posted the allegedly defamatory statement about plaintiff. Because the statement identified plaintiff by name, and Arizona was plaintiff's principal place of business, the Court held that the web page messages "were both directed at Arizona and allegedly caused foreseeable harm to EDIAS" in Arizona. The Court exercised jurisdiction based on all of these contacts with Arizona. 
Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, slip op., available on BNA's Electronic Info. Policy & Law Report at 919 (Ramsey Co. D. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996)

Court upheld jurisdiction in an action by the State Attorney General to enjoin defendant's gambling web site under the state's gambling and consumer protection laws. The evidence showed that Minnesota residents accessed defendant's web site. Noting that courts "do not view the contacts the same as what is necessary for a private litigant to pursue a case," the Court upheld jurisdiction based on the receipt of the Internet ads into Minnesota.

Minnesota v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997).

Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's determination that non-resident defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota based on Internet advertisements for an up-coming Internet gambling service.  The appeals court noted that advertisements placed on the Internet were analogous to broadcast and direct mail solicitations;  activities which, under the Minnesota long-arm statute, are sufficient for an exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Moreover, the placement of Internet advertisements in this case, indicated the defendant's clear intent to solicit business from markets which included Minnesota.

Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).

Sustaining exercise of jurisdiction over defendant where defendant's only contact with Missouri was a web site "published" on a computer in California that "provided information about CyberGold's new upcoming [Internet] service." Court noted that defendant's web site was accessible to any Internet user, including those in Missouri, and in fact had been accessed by people in Missouri. 

Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) Sustaining exercise of jurisdiction over defendant where defendant's only contacts with Connecticut were an Internet web site and an 800 telephone number, both of which advertised defendant's services. The web site and 800 number were accessible to anyone with Internet access or a telephone including Connecticut residents. 
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1996) http://zeus.bna.com/e-law/libindex.html In this case the defendant charity had placed an advertisement seeking donations in the Washington Post and also had an Internet web page that was nationally accessible. The Court found that defendant transacted business and caused tortious injury (based on trademark infringement) in the forum jurisdiction based on the combination of the local newspaper advertisement and the Internet site. While the Court held that, because of the newspaper advertisement, it need not decide if the Internet web site alone would support jurisdiction, the opinion appeared to leave little doubt that it would have sustained jurisdiction based upon the web site alone. 
Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa., Jan 16, 1997) (NO. CIV. A. 96-397 ERIE) Plaintiff, manufacturer of tobacco lighters, sued defendant, an Internet subscription news service, for trademark infringement and dilution. Court found personal jurisdiction based on fact that defendant posted information about its services on its web site and entered into on-line subscription contracts with 3,000 residents of the forum state (Pennsylvania), as well as service contracts with Pennsylvania Internet Service Providers. 
Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523 (S.D. Ind. 1997) Plaintiff initiated contact with defendant via a solicitation at plaintiff's web site. the solicitation indicated that plaintiff was an Indiana start-up company in the medical device field, and was seeking sources of capital. Defendant responded to the solicitation by e-mail. Subsequently, plaintiff and defendant corresponded by e-mail, telephone, and regular mail; their communications included some 80 e-mail messages. The parties met face-to-face (though only in New York), and engaged in intense negotiations for several months. After those negotiations soured, plaintiff filed an action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was no contract formed between the parties regarding certain technology belonging to plaintiff. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Defendant argued that it neither owns property nor conducts business in Indiana; moreover, defendant argued that because it plaintiff first solicited its business via its web site, it had not "purposefully availed [itself] of the privilege of doing business in Indiana" and that therefore the exercise of jurisdiction would contravene the due process clause. The court rejected the motion to dismiss, holding that defendant could not defeat jurisdiction merely by showing that plaintiff initiated the contact between the parties via the World Wide Web. "The parties continued to communicate extensively through electronic mail, the goal of which was to combine their resources to form a new company for purposes of funding the development of [plaintiff's] medical device technology. A continuing and long-term relationship was contemplated, as indicated by the non-binding letter of intent dated August 21, 1996. Even though their face-to-face meetings were out of state, the negotiations and discussions during those meetings were directed towards setting in motion a business operation that would have a significant commercial impact on Indiana. This Court finds that the intended object of the contacts by [defendant] with [plaintiff] and with the State of Indiana were to transact business in Indiana." The issue, the court noted, "is not, as suggested by defendants' counsel, ‘who started it.' Neither is the matter disposed of by the fact that no defendant ever set foot in Indiana. The "footfalls" were not physical, they were electronic. They were, nonetheless, footfalls. The level of Internet activity in this case was significant" enough to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in Indiana. While "one or two inquiries about some Indiana goods or services would not support local jurisdiction," here the "electronic mail messages were numerous and continuous,." Because defendants "unquestionably reached beyond the boundaries of their own states to do business in Indiana, it is not unreasonable for them to be haled into an Indiana forum." The defendant here tried to persuade the court that somehow the Internet is "different," that because the plaintiff initiated the contact with the defendant over the Internet, the court somehow lacked jurisdiction over the defendant, notwithstanding the *many* subsequent contacts between the parties. The court correctly, applying traditional and long-standing notions of personal jurisdiction, rejected the claim. 
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,1997 WL 97097, 1997 US Dis. Lexis 2065) (SDNY Feb. 26, 1997), the federal court decided another in a growing line of Internet personal jurisdiction cases, holding that the New York long-arm statute did not permit a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant solely because the defendant's web site is accessible to, and has been electronically "visited" by, computer users in New York. Plaintiff Hearst Corporation, owner and publisher of Esquire Magazine, brought a trademark infringement action against defendant Ari Goldberger, who has established an Internet domain name and web site, "ESQWIRE.COM." Goldberger's web site offers law office infrastructure network services and legal information services. Goldberger lives in Cherry Hill, New Jersey and works in Philadelphia. The court first held that Goldberger did not "transact business within New York" within the meaning of NY CPLR ºº301(a)(1) because Goldberger's web site is "most analogous to an advertisement in a national magazine," and "New York law is clear . . . that advertisements in national publications are not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1)." Nor was jurisdiction proper under CPLR º302(a)(2) ("Committing a Tortious Act in New York"). The court noted that the tort of trademark infringement occurs within New York in satisfaction of CPLR º302(a)(2) if the "passing off" occurs within New York. But the court held that "Even if Goldberger's Internet web site could be considered an 'offer for sale' where, as here, Goldberger has no produce or service yet available for sale, jurisdiction does not exist in New York based merely on his placing the offer on the Internet outside New York." Nor, finally, could the court exercise jurisdiction under CPLR º302(a)(3) ("Tortious Act Outside New York Causing Injury in New York"). For CPLR º302(a)(3) to be applicable the defendant must be one who either (i) regularly transacts business or "derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state" or (ii) expects his act "to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." Regular solicitation in New York, plus a tortious injury in New York, will suffice for personal jurisdiction under 302(a)(3)(i) even if there is no causal relationship between the advertisement \ and the injury. But here, even if Goldberger's present Internet web site is considered a solicitation (since he does not yet have any product or service to sell), it did not "occur in" New York, thus rendering º302(a)(3)(i) inapplicable. And under º302(a)(3)(ii), Goldberger does not derive "substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce" -- indeed, as the court noted, "it is undisputed that [Goldberger's] business has not derived any revenue at this point." 
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
Internet web page is not sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction in New York. This case involved a trademark infringement suit brought by the owner of the famous New York jazz club (and of the federally registered trademark) "The Blue Note" against the owner of a small Missouri jazz club with the same name, based on alleged infringement on defendant's Internet web site. The court found personal jurisdiction over defendant lacking under both New York statute and constitutional due process, holding that "the mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York," and that "mere foreseeability of an in-state consequence and a failure to avert that consequence [by restricting New Yorkers' access to the web site] is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction." Even if jurisdiction were proper under New York's long-arm statute, asserting jurisdiction would violate constitutional due process: [Defendant] King has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New York. King, like numerous others, simply created a Web site and permitted anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide -- or even worldwide -- but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed towards the forum state. There are no allegations that King actively sought to encourage New Yorkers to access his site, or that he conducted any business -- let alone a continuous and systematic part of its business -- in New York. There is in fact no suggestion that King has any presence of any kind in New York other than the Web site that can be accessed worldwide.


Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 1997 WL 560048 (2nd Cir. (N.Y.) (Sept. 10, 1997))

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that King was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York based on the use of his Internet web site. Without resorting to a due process analysis, the court determined that Bensusan had failed to allege that King had committed a tortious act in New York; an act which is required to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The court stated that King was neither present in the state when the allegedly tortious act (posting of the allegedly infringing trademark) occurred, nor did King reasonably expect that posting his web site would have consequences in New York.

McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, No. 95-4037, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1996).

Refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant solely on the basis of its maintenance of a web site, explaining: Plaintiff has alleged that [defendant] maintains a World Wide Web ("Web") site. Because the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing computer interaction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists; the Court is not willing to take this step. Thus, the fact that [defendant] has a Web site used by Californians cannot establish jurisdiction by itself. 

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

Contempt proceeding against defendant for violation of a 1981 judgment enjoining it from publishing or distributing in the United States its "Playmen" magazine. The court found that defendant had violated the injunction because defendant "actively solicited United States customers to its Internet site, and in doing so has distributed its product within the United States." One of defendants' web sites, however, was not just a source of passive information but was a "pay" site; thus, to access the site, the customer had to subscribe affirmatively to the service and pay defendant, and the customer would receive from defendant a "password" allowing access to the site. Thus, defendant knew that people in the United States were accessing its site. Id. at 1039. Court found the site to be a United States distribution in violation of the injunction: Defendant has actively solicited United States customers to its Internet site, and in doing so has distributed its product within the United States. When a potential subscriber faxes the required form to [defendant] Tattilo, he receives back via e-mail a password and user name. By this process, [defendant] distributes its product within the United States. . . . [Defendant] may of course maintain its Italian Internet site. The Internet is a world-wide phenomenon, accessible from every corner of the globe. [Defendant] cannot be prohibited from operating its Internet site merely because the site is accessible from within one country in which its product is banned. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the global World Wide Web. Such a holding would have a devastating impact on those who use this global service. The Internet deserves special protection as a place where public discourse may be conducted without regard to nationality, religion, sex, age, or to monitors of community standards of decency. However, this special protection does not extend to ignoring court orders and injunctions. If it did, injunctions would cease to have meaning and intellectual property would no longer be adequately protected. 


Digital Equipment Corporation v. Altavista Technology, Inc.
960 F.Supp. 456 (D. Mass. March 12, 1997) ( http://zeus.bna.com/e-law/cases/alta.html)

Digital Equipment Corporation has successfully obtained an injunction against AltaVista Technology, Inc.'s use of the "AltaVista" trademark on the ATI web site. Digital operates the well-known and very successful AltaVista search service (http://altavista.digital.com). In March, 1996, Digital purchased an assignment of ATI's rights to the AltaVista trademark, and immediately licensed back to ATI the right to use the AltaVista name as part of ATI's corporate name and as part of ATI's Web site address ( http://www.altavista.com). The license agreement, however, precluded ATI from using "AltaVista" as "the name of a product or service offering." Shortly thereafter, however, ATI began using the AltaVista name on its own Web site, including at that site, for example, a link that would allow users to "receive demo versions of the AltaVista software." Digital then sued in federal district court (D. Mass), alleging a violation of the license agreement and trademark infringement.
ATI moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that the Massachusetts court lacked personal jurisdiction over ATI, a California corporation. The district court denied the motion. The court noted the difficulties of applying traditional jurisdictional concepts to Internet activity:

"The Internet has no territorial boundaries. . . . Physical boundaries typically have framed legal boundaries, in effect creating signposts that warn that we will be required after crossing to abide by different rules. [citing Johnson & Post, "Law & Borders," 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 1370-71]. To impose traditional territorial concepts on the commercial uses of the Internet has dramatic implications, opening the Web user up to inconsistent regulations throughout fifty states, indeed, throughout the globe."

This case, however, the court noted, does not raise the difficult issue of whether "any Web activity, by anyone, absent commercial use, absent advertising and solicitation of both advertising and sales, absent a contract and sales and other contacts with the forum state, and absent the potentially foreseeable harm of trademark infringement, would be sufficient to permit the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant." Here, because of ATI's prior licensing agreement with Digital and its sales of software to Massachusetts residents, the court found that jurisdiction was permissibly exercised. [The court then went on to hold that ATI had breached its license agreement with Digital and had, therefore, infringed the trademark rights that Digital had
purchased from ATI.]


American Nework, Inc. v. Access America, 1997 WL 466507 (S.D.N.Y. August 14, 1997).

The District Court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over a Georgia Corporation, based on the maintenance of a web site and 6 contracts with New York residents was reasonable. Defendant, Access America ("Access"), sells internet products and services in and around Atlanta. Additionally, Access aids individuals and companies around the county get into the Internet access provider business. Access has approximately 7500 subscribers worldwide, six of which are in New York. Access’s six New York subscribers constitute 0.08% of its customer base. Access maintains a web site as part of their advertising efforts. On its web site, Access refers to the may divisions of its company collectively as "America.Net". Similarly, the plaintiff, American Network Inc. ("ANI"), is a New York corporation which provides internet services. ANI has 18,000 customers; 1500 of which are in New York. ANI has registered the trademark "American Network Inc.", and does business over the internet as "American.Net".

The District Court concluded that both the requirements of the New York long-arm statute and the principles of due process in had been satisfied. As for the long-arm statute, the court concluded that Access’s actions constituted a harm committed in New York in the form of consumer confusion and deception. Furthermore, Access could have reasonably foreseen that posting its web site with the offending trademark would have consequences in New York. Access was clearly attempting to reach customers across the U.S. and had already contracted with six New York subscribers. As for a due process analysis, the court acknowledged that simply maintaining a web site on the internet would not, necessarily, by itself constitute purposeful availment. However, Access’s consistent marketing to the entire U.S., as well as, servicing its customers in New York, were sufficient. Based on these activities it was foreseeable that Access could be haled into court not only where its web site had been viewed, but where Access had secured customers.


Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 1997 WL 739021 (9th Cir. (Ariz.) Dec. 2, 1997), 97 C.D.O.S. 9006.

Holding that it would not comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" for Arizona to exercise personal jurisdiction over an allegedly infringing Florida web site advertiser who has no contacts with Arizona other than maintaining a home page that is accessible to Arizonans, and everyone else, over the Internet.


Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F.Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 1997).

The court concluded that posting a web site in an attempt to advertise and solicit business, was sufficient "to serve as an analogue for physical presence" for purposes of the the Virginia long-arm statute. Adopting the reasoning of Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., the court stated that posting a web site advertisement or solicitation constituted a "persistent course of conduct." Further, because the defendant's web site was accessible to Virginia residents 24 hours a day, such activity was "regular" within the meaning of the long-arm statute.


Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F.Supp. 327 (D. N.J. Sept. 12, 1997).

Plaintiff, Weber, a New Jersey resident, brought suit as a result of injuries sustained while staying at defendant's hotel in Italy; plaintiff asserts that New Jersey may exercise "general" jurisdiction over defendant, an Italian corporation, as a result defendant's Internet advertisements. Analogizing the present case to instances which involve advertisements placed in "national publications", the court concluded that Internet advertising, by itself, was not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction upon a defendant. A finding of "general" jurisdiction, the court noted, requires the defendant's activity with the forum state to be "continuous and substantial;" a threshold requirement not established in this case. Indeed, the court observed "that advertising on the Internet is not tantamount to directing activity at or to purposefully availing oneself of a particular forum."


Superguide v. Kegan, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1770, 1997 WL 754467 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 1997).

Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and venue in Federal Trademark action.  Addressing the issue of personal jurisdiction, the court noted that the even though the extent of the defendant's contacts with North Carolina were unknown, in that the number of "hits" received on defendant's web site from North Carolina residents had not been established, a reasonable inference could be made, based on the fact that North Carolina was a "populated state," that a large number of  residents had visited defendant's web site and utilized his commercial services. Based on this assumption, the court determined that defendant's maintenance of an Internet Web site constituted "substantial activity" sufficient for purposes of the North Carolina long-arm statute.


Gary Scott International v. Baroudi, 1997 WL 710369 (D.Mass. Nov. 13, 1997).

The court held that defendant's maintenance of an Internet Web site, used to solicit business in Massachusetts, combined with defendant's actual sale of 12 "Tobacco Keepers" in Massachusetts and an intention to distribute more of the same, was sufficient for purposes of the long-arm statute and, thus, exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper.